What Is BIP-360?
BIP-360 proposes a Bitcoin output type that drops Taproot's key path. See which public keys stay exposed and why the draft cannot stop every quantum attack.
By Jonathan West · Updated November 17, 2026
BIP-360 is a draft Bitcoin proposal for Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR), an output type that removes Taproot's key path to resist long-exposure quantum attacks
BIP-360 separates protection against public keys exposed on the blockchain from protection against keys revealed while a transaction awaits confirmation
Category
Protocol proposal
Difficulty
Intermediate
Where you'll see it
BIP-360's header and glossary, Bitcoin Optech's quantum-resistance topic, and discussions of post-quantum proposals for Bitcoin
First introduced
Assigned 18 December 2024, according to the BIP-360 header
About pay-to-merkle-root proposal
Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 360 (BIP-360) is a Draft proposal for Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR), a Bitcoin output type that removes Taproot's key-path spend to resist long-exposure quantum attacks. P2MR resembles Pay-to-Taproot (P2TR), but requires spending through a script path rather than a key path. The proposal has not been activated. It would be a soft fork, a change to Bitcoin's consensus rules.
What BIP-360 Proposes
BIP-360 proposes P2MR as a script-tree output without Taproot's key-path spend. A Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) is a numbered document used to describe and discuss a proposed Bitcoin change. An output type sets the rules for spending a transaction output. BIP-360 labels its proposed consensus change a soft fork, a change to Bitcoin's consensus rules. Its header lists the proposal as Draft.
A P2MR output commits to the Merkle root of a script tree rather than an internal key. The root is a 32-byte value representing the committed scripts, which may themselves contain a key or a key-hash. Under the proposal, a mainnet P2MR address would start with bc1z. That prefix identifies the proposed output format, not an output type available for spending on the network today.
The distinction between an output's commitment and a script revealed during spending matters here. Removing the key path means the P2MR output does not publish Taproot's key-path public key when it is created. It does not guarantee that every script committed beneath the root keeps public keys hidden. For background on how consensus-rule changes are proposed, see what a Bitcoin soft fork is.
Why the Key Path Is the Quantum Concern
A Taproot key path leaves a public key exposed in the output, giving a hypothetical attacker a long period to work on that key. BIP-360's authors describe a cryptographically relevant quantum computer as a machine capable of using Shor's algorithm to derive a private key from an exposed elliptic-curve public key. Bitcoin Optech also identifies Shor's algorithm as a threat to Bitcoin's public-key signature systems under that assumption.
BIP-360 calls an attack on public keys already exposed in blockchain data a long-exposure attack. An attacker could examine that data for as long as the vulnerable key remains exposed. A short-exposure attack instead targets a revealed public key. It happens while a spending transaction waits in the mempool, before confirmation. The BIP says this second attack would require a faster quantum computer because the opportunity to use the revealed key is shorter.
Removing the Taproot key path addresses the long-exposure case for a P2MR output whose scripts do not otherwise reveal a public key. It cannot prevent a key from being revealed when a script-based spend requires one. The broader term post-quantum cryptography covers approaches such as the signatures BIP-360 says may be needed for short-exposure protection.
How it actually works
BIP-360 starts from the script-tree design in BIP-341, the deployed Taproot specification. A Taproot output supports a key-path spend and can also commit to scripts that provide other spending paths. BIP-360 keeps the script-tree approach but removes the key path, so a proposed P2MR output commits directly to the tree's root.
The P2MR output contains a 32-byte root. Its proposed scriptPubKey uses OP_2 and OP_PUSHBYTES_32 followed by that root, placing P2MR under SegWit version 2. The bc1z address prefix corresponds to that proposed version. These details describe the draft's spending rules. They do not make a bc1z output spendable under Bitcoin's activated rules.
To spend through a script tree, a transaction reveals the chosen script path and supplies the data that path requires. Other committed paths remain hidden. A script can still contain a public key or key-hash, so removing the output's key path does not remove every possible public-key exposure. The BIP's long-exposure protection depends on avoiding public-key reuse and scripts that disclose vulnerable key information.
BIP-360 also treats a tree with a single leaf differently from Taproot. In the proposal, a depth-zero P2MR tree is considered anyone-can-spend, which discourages its use. The authors instead describe trees with depth one or greater, containing at least two spending paths. That design is intended to incentivize use of a post-quantum-secure leaf script once available.
The proposal reuses Taproot's existing script-tree and tapscript design rather than defining an unrelated scripting system. BIP-360's authors point out that P2WSH already avoids long-exposure key disclosure in its output but does not support tapscript. The proposed P2MR format combines a script-tree output with the removal of Taproot's exposed key path.
Which Bitcoin Output Types Are Exposed
BIP-360 classifies Bitcoin output types by whether their outputs are vulnerable to long-exposure attacks. This table was checked against BIP-360 version 0.12.1 on 17 November 2026. The classification below is the BIP authors' own. The table records that classification rather than a claim that every output marked No* remains protected after its scripts or keys are revealed.
The asterisk matters for P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, and the proposed P2MR type. According to the BIP, funds in any of those outputs can become vulnerable to long-exposure attacks whenever their script reveals a public key. The BIP separately identifies reused outputs as vulnerable.
P2TR is the Taproot type associated with bc1p Taproot addresses. Its Yes entry reflects the public key exposed by the Taproot output itself. P2MR's No* entry describes a proposed output that removes that key path, and it is not a classification of an activated Bitcoin output.
| Output type | Address prefix | Vulnerable to long exposure (per BIP-360) | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| P2PK | Varies | Yes | Vulnerable to long exposure |
| P2PKH | 1 | No* | Can become vulnerable if a script reveals a public key |
| P2MS | Varies | Yes | Vulnerable to long exposure |
| P2SH | 3 | No* | Can become vulnerable if a script reveals a public key |
| P2WPKH | bc1q | No* | Can become vulnerable if a script reveals a public key |
| P2WSH | bc1q | No* | Can become vulnerable if a script reveals a public key |
| P2TR | bc1p | Yes | Taproot output exposes a public key |
| P2MR | bc1z | No* | Proposed output type. Can become vulnerable if a script reveals a public key. |
What P2MR Changes and What It Costs
P2MR replaces the option of a short Taproot key-path spend with script-path spending. BIP-360 says a P2MR spend always has a larger witness than a P2TR key-path spend, which needs only a Schnorr signature. In the BIP's depth-one example, the witnesses are 135 bytes for P2MR and 66 bytes for the P2TR key path, a difference of 69 bytes. The outputs themselves are the same size.
The comparison changes when both spends use equivalent script paths. A P2MR script-path witness is smaller than the equivalent P2TR script-path witness because its control block does not reveal an internal key. The BIP gives a 32-byte difference for that comparison, with a 34-byte difference at tree depth seven because of a size-encoding boundary. Each additional level of tree depth adds 32 bytes of Merkle path to the witness.
BIP-360 describes P2MR and P2TR as having nearly equivalent privacy profiles for information revealed during spending. Both hide unused script paths, unlike P2SH. The depth-zero rule is a difference: P2TR can use a single script leaf, while BIP-360 treats a depth-zero P2MR tree as anyone-can-spend. The tradeoff is therefore specific: removing an exposed key path changes how the output can be spent and changes witness size relative to each Taproot spending path.
What BIP-360 Does Not Do
BIP-360 does not protect a public key during the short period after a spending transaction reveals it and before confirmation. Its security section says protection against that short-exposure attack may require future post-quantum signatures. The authors describe a separate signature proposal as a subject for further research, rather than a feature included in P2MR.
The proposal also cannot keep a public key private if someone exposes it through reuse or through a revealed script. BIP-360 states that its long-exposure protection requires avoiding those exposures. It notes that extended public keys and wallet descriptors can reveal quantum-vulnerable public-key information too. P2MR's No* entry in the output table must be read with those conditions attached.
Draft is the status shown in BIP-360's header. BIP-360 has not been activated, so P2MR is not a spendable output type on the Bitcoin network today. By contrast, BIP-341 lists Taproot as Deployed. Neither a draft specification nor the presence of a proposed address prefix changes the rules currently enforced for existing Bitcoin outputs.
What It Means for Your Own Coins Today
BIP-360's Draft status means the proposal changes nothing about existing Bitcoin addresses. P2MR is not an activated spending option, and the proposal does not convert an existing output into a different type. Its immediate use is as a description of a possible rule change and of the public-key exposures that motivated it.
For an output already on the blockchain, the BIP's distinctions concern the output type and whether a public key has been revealed. It identifies P2PK, reused outputs, and Taproot outputs as vulnerable to long-exposure attacks under its quantum-computer assumption. The No* types in its table have a condition as well: revealing a public key through a script can change their exposure. Reading an address prefix without considering reuse or revealed scripts leaves out that condition.
Its proposed rules would require activation before P2MR could be used as a spendable Bitcoin output. Readers comparing the draft with current Bitcoin rules can use the BIP-360 status header alongside BIP-341's Deployed header, then read the BIP-360 glossary definitions of long and short exposure.
Takeaway on BIP-360
BIP-360 proposes a script-tree output without Taproot's key path to address long-exposure quantum attacks. Its claim depends on public keys staying unexposed through reuse or revealed scripts. The proposal does not cover short-exposure attacks. That boundary matters when assessing the draft's No* classification for P2MR: the label does not promise protection for every way a P2MR output could be spent.
This reading applies to the proposal named Pay-to-Merkle-Root in its Draft header. A change to the BIP's status, name, or security scope would require reading the revised specification. A separate post-quantum signature proposal would need to be assessed on its own terms. Read the BIP-360 Status header and Glossary to check the current scope of BIP-360.
Start here
- 1Open the [BIP-360 specification](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0360.mediawiki) and read its header for the proposal's title, version, and status.
- 2Find the abstract in [BIP-360](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0360.mediawiki) and compare its descriptions of long-exposure and short-exposure attacks.
- 3Read the output-type table in [BIP-360](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0360.mediawiki), including the footnote attached to No* entries.
- 4Compare the P2MR design in [BIP-360](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0360.mediawiki) with the deployed Taproot rules in [BIP-341](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki).
Strengths
- The proposed P2MR output removes Taproot's exposed key path while retaining a script tree.
- BIP-360 defines the long-exposure attack it addresses separately from the short-exposure attack it does not address.
- The specification gives output-type classifications and witness-size comparisons that readers can check against its proposed rules.
Common misunderstandings
- A No* entry does not mean a public key can never be exposed. A revealed script or reused output can change the exposure.
- Removing the key path does not protect a public key revealed while a spending transaction awaits confirmation.
- The bc1z prefix describes a proposed output type, not a spendable output type activated on Bitcoin today.
Common questions
What is a BIP in Bitcoin?
A BIP is a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal, a numbered document used to describe and discuss a proposed Bitcoin change. The Bitcoin BIPs repository holds the specifications, including BIP-360. A BIP's existence does not mean its proposed rules have been activated, and BIP-360's header says Draft while the Taproot specification, BIP-341, says Deployed.
What is P2MR?
P2MR means Pay-to-Merkle-Root, the output type proposed in BIP-360. It commits to a script-tree root without including Taproot's key-path spend. A script beneath that root can still reveal a public key when used, so the proposal's long-exposure protection depends on how keys and scripts are used. P2MR has not been activated as a spendable Bitcoin output type.
Is Taproot quantum resistant?
Taproot outputs are vulnerable to long-exposure quantum attacks under the threat model described in BIP-360. A P2TR output exposes a public key, which is why the BIP marks P2TR Yes in its long-exposure table. BIP-360 proposes removing that key path for P2MR, but its proposed type does not solve short-exposure attacks. The distinction concerns public-key exposure, not every part of Bitcoin's cryptography.
What is a soft fork?
A soft fork is a change to Bitcoin's consensus rules, the type of change listed in BIP-360's header. The Bitcoin soft fork explainer covers the concept in more detail. BIP-360 proposes such a change to add P2MR. Its Draft status means that proposed output type has not been activated.
Is this financial advice?
No. This page explains proposed Bitcoin protocol mechanics and makes no financial recommendation. The BIP-360 specification is the source for the draft's status, design, and stated security limits.
Sources
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